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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Trial Court No. 921900407 
v. : Appellate Court No. 20030262 SC 
DOUGLAS A, LOVELL, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
Douglas Anderson Lovell ("Mr. Lovell") is entitled to have his Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea heard on its merits. Contrary to the State's arguments in opposition 
to Mr. Lovell's opening brief ("AB"), this Court should reverse the trial court's order 
granting the State's Motion to Dismiss and remand this matter to the trial court with 
direction to hear and rule on the merits of Mr. LovelPs motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
The reasons for this are as follows: (A) the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear Mr. 
Lovell's motion to withdraw guilty plea because it was a post-conviction motion and due 
to the unique circumstances of the motion. Mr. Lovell did not waive jurisdiction to have 
the trial court hear his motion to withdraw guilty plea. Any comments made to the trial 
court regarding confusion over the state of jurisdiction did not amount to a waiver of 
jurisdiction. Moreover, the trial court did not rely on these comments to make a ruling 
since the trial court entered no order based on the conversation. As such, Mr. Lovell did 
not lead the trial court into error. Further, even if defense counsel had wanted to waive 
jurisdiction, such was not possible as jurisdiction is not subject to waiver by parties. See 
e.g.. Castle Valley Special Serv. Dist. v. Utah Bd. Oil Gas & Mining, 938 P.2d 248, 254 
(Utah 1996); Barnard v. Wassermann, 844 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993). (B) A mailbox 
rule should apply to letters mailed from a penal institution in order to avoid due process 
and equal protection problems. Mr. Lovell was acting pro se when he made and mailed 
his motion to withdraw guilty plea. See e.g., Houston v. Lack. 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 
(1988). As such, the date of insertion into the jail mail system should constitute the date 
of filing. Consequently, this Court should hold that Mr. Lovell's motion to withdraw 
guilty plea was filed prior to his counsel's filing of the notice of appeal. (C) In the 
alternative, if the trial court was divested of jurisdiction, the trial court erred in not 
determining Mr. Lovell5s intention. (D) This Court should determine that Mr. Lovell's 
motion was timely because State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528, applies since Mr. 
Lovell's original 1993 motion to withdraw guilty plea had never been ruled on and was 
thus pending at the time Ostler was decided. (E) Mr. Lovell is entitled to have his motion 
to withdraw guilty plea heard on its merits and habeas review is an inadequate remedy. 
(F) Finally, this Court should ignore the State's contention that Mr. Lovell's motion to 
withdraw guilty plea lacks merit because the State raises this for the first time on appeal. 
Moreover, Mr. Lovell was acting in a pro se capacity at the time the motion was made 
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and is therefore entitled to leniency. 
Argument 
A. The Trial Court Retained Jurisdiction to Hear Mr. LovelPs Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea. 
Although trial courts generally lose jurisdiction to decide motions once an appeal 
is filed, see, e.g.. Frost v. District Court, 83 P.2d 737, 740 (Utah 1939), numerous 
exceptions to this general rule exist. See AB at 11-17. The unique circumstances of Mr. 
Lovell's 1993 motion to withdraw guilty plea constitute the type of situation where a trial 
court retains jurisdiction. Moreover, Mr. Lovell did not waive jurisdiction to have the trial 
court hear his motion during the August 22, 1994 hearing as the State argues. Appellee's 
Brief ("SB") at 23-26. Rather, defense counsel and the trial judge engaged in a 
conversation where both acknowledged confusion as to whether jurisdiction existed. 
Addendum A at 4-5. This conversation did not persuade the trial court into taking any 
action, as the judge declined to enter a ruling at that time. Addendum at 5 & 7. 
Furthermore, even if it had been the intention of defense counsel to waive jurisdiction, 
such was not possible as jurisdiction is not waivable. See e.g.. Castle Valley Special Serv. 
Dist. v. Utah Bd. Oil Gas & Mining, 938 P.2d 248, 254 (Utah 1996); Barnard v. 
Wassermann. 844 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993). 
1. The Circumstances Under Which the 1993 Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was 
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Made Represent the Type of Situation Where a Trial Court Retains Jurisdiction 
Over a Motion Despite a Notice of Appeal. 
As discussed in Appellant's Brief at 11-17, the particularly unique circumstances 
of this case necessitated the trial court's continued jurisdiction over the motion to 
withdraw guilty plea. Authority exists stating that post trial motions remain within the 
trial court's jurisdiction even after a notice of appeal is filed. See AB at 14-17; see e.g.. 
People v. Miraglia. 753 N.E.2d 398, 402 (111. App. 2001), app. denied. 763 N.E.2d 775 
(111. 2001) (trial court retained jurisdiction over post trial motion after notice of appeal 
was filed); State v. Wade. 873 P.2d 167 (Idaho App. 1994) (trial court retained 
jurisdiction over a motion filed, but not ruled upon, prior to notice of appeal). As 
described in detail in Appellant's Brief at 14-15, prior to the a recent amendment to Rule 
4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a defendant in Mr. Lovell's position found 
himself having to file both a motion to withdraw guilty plea and a notice of appeal within 
the same 30-day time frame. See AB at 14-15. If a notice of appeal divested the trial court 
of jurisdiction to hear the motion to withdraw guilty plea, the defendant would find 
himself in the precarious situation of having to choose between pursuing an appeal, or 
having his motion to withdraw guilty plea heard on its merits. AB at 14-15. The State 
attempts to confuse the matter by arguing that Mr. Lovell's motion was not timely. 
However, because State v. Ostler. 2002 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528, applies to Mr. Lovell's case, 
see Part D; AB at 28-31, not only was Mr. Lovell's motion timely, but both the motion 
and notice had to be filed within 30-days of sentencing. Thus, Mr. Lovell was in the 
4 
position of having to file both his motion to withdraw guilty plea and his notice of appeal 
within the same time frame. 
Additionally, the State acknowledges that even without filing a notice of appeal, 
Mr. Lovell was entitled to have conviction and sentence automatically reviewed by this 
Court. See SB at 34-35; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) (providing for automatic review 
of all capital sentences); see also, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 
(1976)(plurality)(upholding Georgia's amended death penalty statute largely because the 
Georgia statutory scheme provided the "additional safeguard" against arbitrariness and 
caprice of "automatic appeal for all death sentences to the State's Supreme Court"); 
Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1976)(upholding Florida's death penalty statute 
in part because automatic review was statutorily required); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 
54 (1984)(Stevens, J., concurring)(uSome form of meaningful appellate review is 
constitutionally required" to "eliminate^ the systemic arbitrariness and capriciousness 
which infected the death penally schemes invalidated in Furman v. Georgia"). In light of 
the fact that Mr. Lovell would have had his conviction reviewed even if no notice of 
appeal had been filed, coupled with the fact that Mr. Lovell was not informed of, and did 
not consent to, the filing of the appeal, and the unique timing requirements, this Court 
should find that the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Mr. Lovell's 
motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
2. Mr. Lovell Did Not Waive Jurisdiction. 
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The trial court maintained jurisdiction to hear Mr. Lovell's 1993 motion to 
withdraw guilty plea. The State mistakenly argues that the invited error doctrine precludes 
Mr. Lovell from arguing that the trial court retained jurisdiction of his 1993 motion to 
withdraw. This argument suffers from three incurable deficiencies: (1) any statements 
regarding the state of jurisdiction made by defense counsel at the August 22, 1994 
hearing were expressions of confusion about the law, not an advertent attempt to 
misguide the court; (2) the trial court made no ruling in the 1994 hearing, and thus was 
not "led" into taking any action whatsoever; and (3) even if Mr. Lovell contemplated 
waiving jurisdiction in August 1994, he did not have the power to do so. 
The invited error doctrine holds that a party cannot take advantage of an error 
which the party led the court into making. See e.g. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 
(Utah 1987); State v. Lafferty. 2002 UT 19,1f34 n.9, 20 P.3d 342; State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). The purposes behind the doctrine are two-fold. "First, it fortifies 
our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address 
the claim or error. Second, it discourages parties from intentionally misleading the trial 
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220 
(citations omitted). Thus, in order to achieve the second goal of the doctrine, the party 
leading the court into error must have done so intentionally. See e.g., Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1220 (citations omitted) (invited error doctrine is to "discourage[] parties from 
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on 
6 
appeal") (emphasis added). 
As discussed in Part Dl, defense counsel merely expressed confusion about 
whether the trial court had jurisdiction. Defense did not advertently misguide the trial 
court as the invited error doctrine contemplates. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. As such, 
any confusion expressed by defense counsel at the August 1994 hearing did not rise to the 
level of inviting error. 
Moreover, even if this court determines that defense counsel was engaged in an 
attempt to lead the trial court into error, defense counsel failed. The trial court was not led 
into any ruling as a result of the August 1994 hearing. Rather, the trial court decided to 
wait for guidance from this Court. The court did not rule on the motion to withdraw guilty 
plea until 2002. As such, it cannot be said that Mr. Lovell caused the trial court to enter 
an erroneous ruling in 1994. 
Since defense counsel simply expressed confusion as to the law, and since the trial 
court did not enter any ruling in response to the August 1994 hearing, Mr. Lovell did not 
waive his claim that the trial court retained jurisdiction to consider his original 1993 
motion to withdraw guilty plea, which has never been heard. 
a. Even if Defense Counsel Had Attempted to Waive Jurisdiction, It Was 
Not Possible for Him to Do So. 
Even if defense counsel had attempted to waive jurisdiction at the August 1994 
hearing, such would not have been possible. The state of jurisdiction is absolute and 
nonwaivable. The State is correct in recognizing that a party cannot waive an argument 
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that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See SB at 26; Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 
P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993). The State becomes confused, however, when it argues that a 
party may waive subject matter jurisdiction. SB at 26. Although a party may avoid 
jurisdiction by, for example, not bringing a suit, a party has no power to waive 
jurisdiction. See e j ^ Castle Valley Special Serv. Dist. v. Utah Bd. Oil Gas & Mining, 938 
P.2d 248, 254 (Utah 1996); Barnard v. Wassermann, 844 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993). 
See, also. Rehabilitative Resources v. Gibson, No. 02-1550A, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
515, at *2 (Mass. Super. 2002) (subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived)(case 
attached in Addendum B). This principle has been widely acknowledged. 
For example, in Stimpson Commuting Scale Co v. Superior Court, the California 
Court of Appeals recognized that jurisdiction is nonwaivable. 107 P. 1013 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1910). The court there determined that a party did not waive jurisdiction by filing his 
answers in another court. The reason jurisdiction had not been waived was simple: 
u[p]arties cannot waive jurisdiction of the subject matter nor confer it by consent." Id. at 
1015. Similarly in Rehabilitative Resources, a Massachusetts court held that "subject 
matter jurisdiction is an issue to be determined solely by the court, therefore the parties 
cannot waive jurisdiction . . . ." 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 515 at 2. See also, Kirslis v. 
Kirslis, No. 01-1065, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 395, at *3 (Mass. Super. 2001) 
(same)(case attached in Addendum B); Kessler v. Sinclair, No. 92-67-64-G, 1995 Mass. 
Super. LEXIS 461, at *4 (Mass. Super. 1995) (same)(case attached in Addendum B). As 
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such, even if defense counsel had tried to waive jurisdiction back in August of 1994, he 
was without power to do so. See Castle Valley, Barnard, supra. 
B. This Court Should Adopt a Mail Box Rule to Determine That Mr. Lovell's Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea Was Filed Before the Notice of Appeal. 
As discussed extensively in Appellant's Brief at 20-24, due process and equal 
protection require that this Court adopt a mailbox rule with regards to prisoners. See e.g. 
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988) (interpreting federal rule to include 
mailbox rule and recognizing that "unique circumstances" of prisoners makes it 
impossible for them to "file" papers in person); Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. 
1992) (finding that the equal protection clause under the Florida Constitution requires the 
recognition of a mailbox rule for incarcerated individuals). If such a rule is adopted, this 
court should determine that Mr. Lovell's 1993 motion to withdraw guilty plea was filed 
prior to the notice of appeal.1 
The State attempts to distinguish the cases of Houston, 487 U.S. 266, and Haag, 
591 So. 2d 614, by stating that those cases dealt with pro se defendants whereas Mr. 
Lovell was represented by counsel. SB at 39. This position misapprehends Mr. Lovell's 
situation at the time he made his motion to withdraw guilty plea. Mr. Lovell was, in fact, 
*Mr. Lovell's motion to withdraw guilty plea was dated August 25, 1993. Mr. 
Lovell's uncontested affidavit states that he placed the motion in the prison mail system 
on that date. R. 1910. 
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acting in a pro se capacity when he filed the motion. He had attempted to contact his 
attorney in order to withdraw his plea for over a week prior to the time he made the 
motion. R. 383. His attorney, however, did not contact him and therefore did not take any 
action to file a motion on Mr. Lovell's behalf. Id- Consequently, Mr. Lovell, representing 
himself, drafted and sent his own motion to withdraw guilty plea. R. 1910. As such, this 
Court should find that the due process and equal protection rationales in Houston, 487 
U.S. 266 and .Haag, 591 So. 2d 614 apply to Mr. Lovell's situation. Consequently, the 
Court should adopt a mailbox rule and find that Mr. Lovell's motion to withdraw guilty 
plea was filed before the notice of appeal. 
C. If the Appeal Notice Divested the Trial Court of Jurisdiction to Hear the Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea, the Trial Court Erred in Not Ascertaining Mr. Lovell's 
Intentions. 
If the appeal notice deprived the trial court of jurisdiction, the trial court erred by 
not ascertaining how Mr. Lovell wished to proceed. See AB at 24-25. The State contends 
that this "asks the Court to look only at the six days in August 1993 between the date on 
his motion to withdraw and the dates he filed the motion and the appeal notice." SB at 41. 
If by this the State intends to imply that the only time there could have been a question as 
to Mr. Lovell's intention were the six days between the date on which Mr. Lovell made 
his motion to withdraw guilty plea (August 25, 1993), R. 383, and the day on which Mr. 
Lovell's counsel filed a notice of appeal without Mr. Lovell's knowledge or consent 
(August 30, 1993), R. 381-83, then the State misses the point completely. In fact, during 
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the six days the State refers to, there was no indication that there was any conflict. During 
those six days, only Mr. Lovell's motion to withdraw guilty plea existed. Since his 
attorney of record had not filed a notice of appeal during that time frame, there was, of 
course, no conflict. In other words, there could be no argument that the trial court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Lovell's motion since nothing had been filed that could 
possibly divest the court of jurisdiction. 
It was not until after Mr. Lovell's counsel filed the unnecessary notice of appeal on 
August 30, 1993 that conflicting intentions could be perceived. At that point, the trial 
court should have dealt with any potential conflict. Mr. Lovell made it known to the trial 
court that his attorney was not in contact with him. The trial court also knew that Mr. 
Lovell was dissatisfied with his counsel to the point of wanting to fire him and the trial 
court knew Mr. Lovell wished to withdraw his guilty plea. Given this knowledge, if there 
was any conflict between the notice of appeal and the motion to withdraw guilty plea, the 
trial court should have inquired into Mr. LovelPs desires. 
Moreover, the fact that Mr. Lovell chose to pursue his appeal does not indicate any 
intention on his part to abandon his motion to withdraw guilty plea as the State seems to 
argue. SB at 41. The prosecutor did not suggest that there was a problem with Mr. Lovell 
pursuing both the motion to withdraw guilty plea and the notice of appeal in a September 
20, 1993 hearing stating: "the Supreme Court moving on the appeal wouldn't have 
anything to do with Your Honor's ruling on [the motion to withdraw guilty plea]." R. 
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1330. It was not until the August 1994 hearing when jurisdiction was discussed for the 
first time. R. 2242 at page 4-5. The trial court, instead of ascertaining Mr. Lovell's desires 
at that point chose to enter no ruling and wait for this Court to provide further guidance. 
R. 2242 at 5. By taking this approach, the trial court indicated to Mr. Lovell that both his 
motion to withdraw and appeal were harmoniously coexisting for the time being. It was 
not until 2002 that the trial court indicated otherwise when it held that it did not have 
jurisdiction to consider Mr. Lovell's renewed motion to withdraw guilty plea. Thus, Mr. 
Lovell did not indicate any intention to abandon his motion to withdraw guilty plea by 
pursuing his appeal. The prosecutor and the trial court led Mr. Lovell into believing that 
both his motion and his appeal could exist concurrently. If such was not the case, the trial 
court, knowing there was a conflict between Mr. Lovell and his counsel, should have 
ascertained how Mr. Lovell wished to proceed. 
D. This Court Should Determine That Mr. Lovell's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
Was Timely Because Ostler Applies Since Lovell had a Motion Pending at the 
Time Ostler was Decided. 
This Court's decision in State v. Ostler should apply in this case to make Mr. 
Lovell's 1993 motion to withdraw guilty plea timely because Mr. Lovell's motion was 
pending at the time Ostler was decided. 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528 (holding that 30-days 
runs from date of final disposition, not from entry of plea). The State acknowledges that if 
Ostler applies., Mr. Lovell's motion to withdraw guilty plea was timely. SB at 18, 21. The 
State asserts two, equally meritless claims as to why Mr. Lovell had no motion pending 
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when Ostler was decided. First, the State argues that the trial court dismissed Mr. Lovell's 
1993 motion to withdraw guilty plea at the August 22, 1994 hearing. SB at 18-19. 
Second, the State argues that defense counsel waived any jurisdictional argument by 
leading the court to dismiss the motion to withdraw guilty plea for lack of jurisdiction. SB 
at 23-26. However, both of these arguments lack merit because the trial court did not 
make any ruling with regards to the August 1994 hearing. 
1. Since the Trial Court Did Not Enter a Ruling on Mr. Lovell's Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea Until 2002, He Did Not "Lead"It Into Any Error. 
The State attempts to argue that the 1993 motion was dismissed by the trial court at 
the August 1994 motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The State further alleges that 
at the August 1994 hearing, defense counsel persuaded the trial court to dismiss Mr. 
Lovell's motion to withdraw guilty plea. SB at 18-19, 23-26. The State misconstrues what 
took place at the 1994 hearing. Instead of arguing for dismissal, defense counsel, along 
with the trial judge, merely expressed confusion as to whether the trial court had 
jurisdiction. Addendum A at page 4-5. The trial court determined that it would wait until 
this Court gave further instructions, stating: 
I'd be interested to see what the Supreme Court has to say about the effect 
of the filing of the appeal on staying the - the time for filing. The motion to 
set aside [the plea] may very well impact the issue. In giving a ruling on 
that, that would sure be helpful to me. ... I think -1 think the filing of the 
appeal has effectively deprived me of jurisdiction in the case unless the 
Supreme Court agree to the remand. So why don't we let the attorney 
general worry about it until we hear from them. 
Addendum A. at page 5. The trial court, however, never issued an order at this point. R. 
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2242 at page 7. In fact, the trial court did not dismiss for lack of jurisdiction until 2002. 
Thus, when Ostler was decided, the motion had never been ruled on and was still 
pending. As such, defense counsel's confusion regarding jurisdiction did not lead the 
court into any action. 
Because the trial court did not enter any finding regarding jurisdiction until 2002, 
one year after Ostler was decided, Mr. Lovell's original motion to withdraw guilty plea 
was pending when Ostler was decided in 2001. Consequently, Ostler should control. See 
e.g.. State v. Taysom, 886 P.2d 513 n.3 (Utah 1994) (applying decision retroactively 
where case was pending on appeal); AB at 28-31. 
E. This Court Should Remand to the Trial Court Because Mr. Lovell's Motion to 
Withdiaw Guilty Plea Needs to be Heard on Its Merits. 
Mr. Lovell has never had his motion to withdraw guilty plea heard on its merits. 
This Court should remand with instructions to consider Mr. Lovell's motion to withdraw 
guilty plea. Only then will Mr. Lovell be able to have his day in court. 
While the State may argue that affirming the lower court's ruling in this case will 
not necessarily deprive Mr. Lovell of his opportunity to have his motion heard on the 
merits because Mr. Lovell could raise the issue in a collateral attack, this is an inadequate 
remedy. Such an argument ignores the limitations imposed on collateral reviews. For 
example, although State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1313-14 (Utah 1987), holds that trial 
courts must strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in 
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accepting a plea, Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993), limits that holding in 
the habeas context. Salazar held that "a rule 11 violation does not warrant habeas corpus 
relief absent the deprivation of a constitutional right." Id. Consequently, to assume that 
Mr. Lovell will be able to have his motion heard on its merits in the habeas context 
ignores the realities of habeas review. 
Furthermore, public policy considerations mandate that trial courts deal with such 
issues directly instead of redirecting them into habeas review. In general, "there is no 
constitutionally or statutorily guaranteed right to counsel when defendants elect to pursue 
collateral attacks on their convictions." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, [^13 n. 4, 12 P.3d 
92 (citations omitted). Thus, habeas provides an inadequate forum for such motions. 
Consequently, in order to ensure that defendants are adequately represented, motions such 
as Mr. Loveil's, should be resolved in the first instance by trial courts. 
In order to allow Mr. Lovell to have his motion considered in a manner consistent 
with other, similar motions, and in order to promote a policy whereby adequate 
representation is guaranteed, this Court should not accept an argument that Mr. Lovell 
could pursue this issue collaterally. 
F. This Court Should Ignore the State's Contention Regarding the Merits of Mr. 
LovelLs Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Because the State Raises This Issue for 
the First Time on Appeal 
The State now appears to attempt to engage in a discussion regarding the merits of 
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Mr. LovelLs motion to withdraw guilty plea. SB at 21-23. The State raises this issue for 
the first time on appeal. In fact, at a motion hearing on October 2, 2002, the State refused 
to address the merits of the motion to withdraw guilty plea. Addendum D at pages 1-6. 
Since this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it should be disregarded. See e.g. In 
re Schwenke. 2004 UT 17,1f34, 2004 Utah LEXIS 27 ("It is well-established that we 
generally will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal") (citing State v. 
Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)). 
1. If This Court Chooses to Address the Issue of Merits on Appeal This Court 
Should Recognize That Mr. Lovell Was Acting Pro Se When He Made His Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea, and Thus Is Entitled to a Less Strict Requirement of 
Particularity in His Motion. 
If this Court decides to address the merits of Mr. Lovell's motion to withdraw 
guilty plea, it should recognize that Mr. Lovell was acting in a pro se capacity at the time 
he made the motion. As such, this Court should give a liberal reading the motion. 
The State contends that Mr. Lovell s motion only raised one issue in his 1993 
motion to withdraw guilty plea. SB at 21-23. In fact, Mr. Lovell s motion indicated that 
he had multiple grounds for wishing to withdraw the guilty plea.2 The State argues that 
under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(a), a defendant must "state with 
particularity the grounds upon which [a motion] is made." SB at 21 n.6. However, the 
2
 The State's argument largely ignores that once Mr. Lovell had the assistance of 
counsel to review and assist on his motion to withdraw guilty plea, many additional 
grounds were found to exist and were briefed. R. 1827-1960. 
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State fails to take into consideration that Mr. Lovell was proceeding pro se when he made 
the motion to withdraw guilty plea. Clear precedent holds that pro se defendants should 
be afforded leniency. For example, in Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 286, 76 P 3d 
1170, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that"[although a pro se defendant is required to 
adhere to procedural rules and the law, leniency may be appropriate in limited 
circumstances. A pro se defendant's 'lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure ... 
should be accorded every consideration that may reasonably be indulged.'" Id. at ^ 12 
(quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) (further citations 
omitted)). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that the pleadings of 
pro se complaintants should be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). 
In light of such precedent, Mr. Lovell is entitled to a liberal reading of his motion. 
In addition to having conflicts with his attorney, Mr. Lovell had attempted to contact his 
attorney for over a week before making the motion to withdraw guilty plea. He was, 
however, unable to obtain any sort of response from his attorney. R. 383. Having no other 
recourse, Mr. Lovell proceeded to represent himself by making his motion to withdraw 
guilty plea and immediately depositing it into the prison mail system. R. 1910. As such, 
his "lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure ... should be accorded every 
consideration that may reasonably be indulged." Boyo, 2003 UT App 286 at 1fl2 (further 
citations omitted). Thus, the fact that his motion lacked the strict particularity required of 
17 
motions prepared by legally-trained attorneys, should be overlooked. A more elaborate 
explanation of the "reasons" alluded to by Mr. Lovell could have been elicited at a 
hearing on the merits. However, no hearing has yet been afforded to Mr. Lovell. 
Accordingly, if this Court chooses to address the merits, this Court should remand to 
allow Mr. Lovell to elaborate on his grounds for withdrawal, which are already explained 
in detail in the arguments subsequently filed by counsel (R. 1827-1960). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in Mr. Lovell's opening brief, the 
judgement of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded for a hearing on the 
merits of Mr. Lovell's motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
SUBMITTED this p p ^ S i a y of March, 2004. 
CLARK DONALDSON 
Attorney for Mr. Lovell 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: LET'S GO BACK TO DOUGLAS LOVELL NOW. 
MR. BRADSHAW: YOUR HONOR, JIM BRADSHAW APPEARING 
FOR MR. LOVELL, WHO IS PRESENT. ALSO KAREN CHANEY APPEARING 
AS COUNSEL. 
I PUT A MOTION BEFORE THE COURT FOR HER TO APPEAR PRO 
HAC VICE. I WOULD ASK THE COURT ACCEPT THAT. 
• THE COURT: PARDON ME? 
MR. BRADSHAW: I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO ACCEPT HER 
AS COUNSEL OF RECORD AS WELL. 
THE COURT: STATE HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THAT? 
MR. HEWARD: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: SO ORDERED. 
MR. BRADSHAW: WE'RE HERE ON THE STATE'S MOTION 
TODAY. 
MR. HEWARD: WE ARE, YOUR HONOR. THE STATE FILED A 
MOTION TO DISMISS A MOTION TO WITHDRAW THAT WAS FILED BY 
MR. LOVELL ABOUT A YEAR AGO. I OUTLINED IN THE MOTION THE 
APPLICABLE DATES AND THE FACT THAT NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE ON 
THE CASE. 
JUST FOR A REFRESHER, A LETTER WAS RECEIVED BY YOUR 
HONOR TOWARD THE END OF AUGUST OF 1993. YOU SET A HEARING ON 
THAT IN SEPTEMBER. MR. LOVELL CAME IN AT THE TIME AND WAS 
PRO SE WHERE HE INDICATED HE WANTED TO GO AHEAD PRO SE. 
REQUESTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE. YOU GAVE HIM ABOUT 
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THREE MONTHS TO DO THAT. HE CAME BACK IN DECEMBER AND I 
BELIEVE AT THAT TIME INDICATED TO YOUR HONOR THAT HE DID WANT 
COUNSEL. 
YOU CONTINUED THE CASE FOR A COUPLE OF WEEKS, GAVE HIM 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO MR. LAKER FROM OUR PUBLIC 
DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION. MR. LAKER ENTERED ON HIS BEHALF AND 
YOU SET A HEARING FOR THE END OF FEBRUARY. MR. LAKER THEN 
CANCELLED THAT, AND SPECIFICALLY ABOUT A MONTH AFTER THAT WE 
RECEIVED NOTICE FROM MR. BRADSHAW AND MS. CHANEY THAT THEY 
WOULD BE ENTERING. 
NOTHING HAD BEEN DONE ON THE CASE, NO CALENDARING. I 
HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY CONTACT FROM MS. CHANEY OR FROM 
MR. BRADSHAW, NEITHER HAD MR. DAINES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE CASE 
WAS SIMPLY SITTING THERE. WE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE BECAUSE THEY HAVEN'T DONE ANYTHING ON 
THE MATTER. YOU'VE HAD A MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA 
SITTING, THE FILE OPEN FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR NOW. 
WE FILED A RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO HIS MOTION. IT WAS 
NOT TIMELY. WE WOULD,ASK YOU TO RULE ON THAT. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT — OR THE COURT OF APPEALS 
SPECIFICALLY IN STATE OF UTAH VERSUS DAVIS — AND I HAVE A 
COPY FOR THE COURT AS WELL AS ONE FOR DEFENSE COUNSEL — 
INDICATED THAT IT I S A JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE. I F THEY MISS 
THE FILING DEADLINE AS MR. LOVELL DID IN THIS CASE BY 
APPROXIMATELY 30 DAYS, THE COURT WOULD BE WITHOUT AUTHORITY 
T 3nr*-i a CKinr,!^ r* <~* T\ 
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TO ACT. WE WOULD ASK THAT YOU SO RULE. 
MR. BRADSHAW: INITIALLY, YOUR HONOR, LET ME JUST 
INDICATE THAT WE ARE NOT HERE TO ADDRESS THE MERITS OF THE 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA. IT'S NOT BEFORE THE COURT AND 
HAS NOT BEEN NOTICED FOR A HEARING AND I'M NOT PREPARED TO 
ADDRESS THE ISSUE ITSELF. 
I THINK THE QUESTION IS THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE THE MOTION BEFORE THE COURT. AND 
QUITE FRANKLY, I THINK IT'S — IT'S A DIFFICULT QUESTION 
BECAUSE IT'S A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION. 
BY WAY OF BACKGROUND — AND I'M AT A BIT OF DISADVANTAGE 
BECAUSE YOU ALL WERE HERE AND I WAS NOT, BUT IN LOOKING AT 
THE COURT'S FILE IT APPEARS TO ME THAT ON JUNE 28TH OF 1993 
MR. LOVELL ENTERED A PLEA. AND THAT ON AUGUST 5TH THE COURT 
IMPOSED SENTENCE. ON AUGUST 30TH COUNSEL AT THE TIME, 
MR. CAINE, FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL, AT WHICH POINT 
JURISDICTION WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. ON 
AUGUST 31ST, ONE DAY LATER, THE COURT RECEIVED FROM 
MR. LOVELL A PRO SE HANDWRITTEN MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF HIS 
PLEA. THAT MOTION HAS NOT BEEN RULED UPON. 
AND — AND THE COUNTY ATTORNEYS ARE CORRECT IN 
INDICATING IT HAS NOT BEEN PROSECUTED, BUT I THINK THE REASON 
FOR THAT IS THERE'S BEEN SOME VERY SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT 
WHETHER THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR SUCH AN ISSUE. I 
BELIEVE THAT THE APPROPRIATE WAY TO DETERMINE THAT IS 
T a n r - i o q h i n n l p C .9 R . 
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PRESENTLY BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT. WE HAVE FILED WITH THE 
SUPREME COURT A REQUEST FOR REMAND UNDER RULE 23B OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. IT'S A FAIRLY NEW RULE, BUT IT 
ALLOWS FOR THE COURT TO REMAND UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES SO 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT MAY MAKE A DETERMINATION. 
IF, IN FACT, THE COURT GRANTS THE REQUEST FOR 
REMAND, CERTAINLY IT'S APPROPRIATE FOR THIS COURT TO THEN 
RULE ON THE MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA. IF THE COURT 
DENIES THE MOTION FOR REMAND, THEN IT VERY WELL MAY BE 
APPROPRIATE FOR THIS COURT TO RECONSIDER THE STATE'S MOTION. 
BUT AT THIS POINT IN TIME I THINK IT'S PREMATURE AND 
INAPPROPRIATE FOR THIS COURT TO TAKE ANY — ANY — TO TAKE 
ANY ACTION IN REGARDS TO MR. LOVELL'S CASE OR THIS SPECIFIC 
MOTION. 
THE COURT: I'M INCLINED TO THINK YOU'RE PROBABLY 
CORRECT. AND I'D BE INTERESTED TO SEE WHAT THE SUPREME COURT 
HAS TO SAY ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE FILING OF THE APPEAL ON 
STAYING THE — THE TIME FOR FILING. THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
MAY VERY WELL IMPACT THAT ISSUE. 
IN GIVING A RULING ON THAT, THAT WOULD SURE BE HELPFUL 
TO ME. 
MR. HEWARD: I'M A LITTLE CONFUSED, YOUR HONOR. 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE — AND I READ RULE 23 AND I 
DON'T SEE WHERE IT TALKS ABOUT WHAT COUNSEL IS REFERRING TO. 
MR. BRADSHAW: 23B PROVIDES FOR REMAND TO THE 
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DISTRICT COURT BASED UPON EVIDENTIARY FINDINGS REGARDING 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE THE MOST RECENT EDITION? 
MR. HEWARD: I DO, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. BRADSHAW: RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
MR. HEWARD: YES, RULE 2 3 B . SAYS "RESPONSE" UNDER 
"MOTIONS." I S THAT WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT? 
MS. CHANEY: NO, NO. I T ' S 2 3 CAPITAL B . 
MR. HEWARD: GOT I T . OKAY. 
MR. BRADSHAW: I HAVE IT HERE I F YOUR HONOR WOULD — 
THE COURT: TWENTY-THREE. 
MR. BRADSHAW: I HAVE PROVIDED TO THE COURT A COPY 
OF OUR MOTION — COURTESY COPY, WHICH WE FILED IN THE COURT. 
THE COURT: I ' M SORRY. WHERE ARE YOU LOOKING? 
MR. BRADSHAW: I F I MIGHT APPROACH, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YEAH. 
MR. BRADSHAW: I T ' S A CONFUSING STATUTE BECAUSE 
THERE'S A RULE 23 AND THEN A 23A AND THEN A 2 3 B . 
THE COURT: OH, I SEE. TWENTY-THREE — OH, OKAY. 
I MR. BRADSHAW: NOT PAREN B . 
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I THE COURT: WE WERE LOOKING UNDER 2 3 . YEAH. I ' M 
I WITH YOU. SO YOU'RE LOOKING UNDER RULE 2 3 B , NOT SUB B . 
I MR. BRADSHAW: REMAND FOR A FACTUAL DETERMINATION. 
w 
I THE COURT: ONLY ATTORNEYS HAVE CONVERSATIONS LIKE 
I T H I S . 
Br 
ai 
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MR. BRADSHAW: RIGHT. RIGHT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. OKAY. I ' M INCLINED TO AGREE 
WITH YOUR ANALYSIS CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF THE SETTING ASIDE. I THINK — I 
THINK THE FILING OF THE APPEAL HAS EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED ME OF 
JURISDICTION IN THE CASE UNLESS THE SUPREME COURT AGREES TO 
THE REMAND. SO WHY DON'T WE LET THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WORRY 
ABOUT IT UNTIL WE HEAR FROM THEM. 
I ' M GLAD — I ' M GLAD WE HAD THIS — THIS HEARING BECAUSE 
I ' V E BEEN VERY CONCERNED THAT THE APPEAL HASN'T BEEN MOVING 
ALONG. WE NEEDED TO DO SOMETHING TO EXPEDITE I T . 
MR. BRADSHAW: I T ' S ON COURSE NOW. 
MS. CHANEY: FOR THE RECORD, JUDGE, WE FILED A 
DOCKETING STATEMENT FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME OF 14 DAYS AND 
WE'VE BEEN GRANTED ONE EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILING OF THE 
BRIEF, AND THAT'S THROUGH STIPULATION OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL. 
THE COURT: OKAY. VERY GOOD. 
MR. BRADSHAW: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: WE'LL SEE YOU. 
MR. BRADSHAW: SHOULD I PREPARE AN ORDER TO THAT 
EFFECT? 
THE COURT: NO, I DON'T THINK THAT'S EVEN NECESSARY. 
MS. CHANEY: THANK YOU, JUDGE. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDE) 
L a n r i ^ P h i n r r l n n a T, 
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
I, LAURIE SHINGLE, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 
EIGHT PAGES OF TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE 
RECORD OF THE MOTION PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY 
KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
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LAURIE SHINGLE, C.S.R 
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TabB 
LEXSEE2001 MASS. SUPER. LEXIS 395 
Peter G. Kirslis v. Vincent C. Kirslis nl 
nl Defended by Francis Brown, the Administrator of the Estate of 
Vincent C. Kirsils 
01-1065 
SUPERIOR COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT MIDDLESEX 
2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 395 
July 20,2001, Decided 
July 23, 2001, Filed 
DISPOSITION: [*1] Defendant's motion to dismiss ALLOWED. 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
JUDGES: Raymond J. Brassard, Justice of the Superior Court. 
OPINIONBY: Raymond J. Brassard 
OPINION: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
On June 28, 2001, this matter was before the court for hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant 
to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The defendant argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
plaintiffs complaint seeking monetary compensation from the decedent's estate because of the plaintiffs 
failure to serve timely notice upon the administrator or to file notice of claim in the proper probate court as 
required under G.L.c. 197, § 9. In opposition, the plaintiff contends that he gave timely statutory notice. 
After a hearing and careful review of the papers, for the following reasons, the defendant's motion to 
dismiss is ALLOWED. 
BACKGROUND 
Vincent C. Kirslis ("the decedent") died on March 12, 2000. According to the plaintiff, Peter G. Kirslis 
("Kirslis"), the decedent's brother, at the time of the decedent's death, owed Kirslis $ 887,142.00. That 
amount reflects, among other things, money the decedent allegedly stole from [*2] Kirslis, the amount 
Kirslis spent on the decedent's burial expenses, and the amount the decedent owed Kirlsis for maintaining 
their late father's house. 
In an effort to recover the money owed him, on March 1, 2001, Kirslis went to the Cambridge Probate 
Court to file notice of his claim against the estate of the decedent. The court allegedly told Kirslis that he 
would first have to initiate the lawsuit in the Superior Court before he could file his notice of claim in the 
Probate Court. Accordingly, on March 12,2001, Kirslis filed his complaint against the decedent in the 
Superior Court alleging that he was entitled to compensation for acts of theft, and negligence for which the 
decedent was responsible. Thereafter, Kirslis went to the local deputy sheriff to effect service upon the 
Administrator of the estate, Francis Brown ("the Administrator"), and the deputy sheriff advised him to 
contact another deputy sheriff from the appropriate jurisdiction to properly serve the complaint. Kirslis did 
subsequently go to the appropriate jurisdiction and retained a deputy sheriff who on March 28, 2001, served 
the complaint upon the Administrator. 
As of March 12, 2001, Kirslis had not [*3] filed a notice of claim with the Probate Court and had not 
effected service upon the Administrator. On April 16, 2001, the Administrator filed the present motion to 
dismiss all claims filed in the complaint. 
DISCUSSION 
Under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) a complaint may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
See Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction determines whether a court can hear a particular 
type of suit. See Standard Oil Co. v. Montecatini Edison S.P.A., 342 F. Supp. 125, 129 (1972). Because it 
is an issue determined solely by the court, the parties cannot waive lack of jurisdiction or confer jurisdiction 
where it does not exist. See Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 519, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956); see Shea v. 
Neponset River Marine & Sportfishing, Inc., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 121, 129, 437 N.E.2d250 (1982). In 
making its determination, the court may consider materials that extend beyond the scope of the pleadings. 
See Watrosv. Greater Lynn Mental Health and Retardation Ass'n, Inc., 421 Mass. 106, 108-09, 653 
N.E.2d 589 (1995). If the court determines that it does not have subject matter 1*41 jurisdiction, it must 
dismiss the claim even if the parties have failed to raise the issue. Norfolk Electric, Inc. v. Fall River 
Housing Authority, 417 Mass. 207, 209 n.3, 629 NE2d 967 (1994); Markv. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 519, 
131 NE.2d758 (1956). 
The Administrator argues that pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), this court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction due to Kirslis's failure to serve timely notice of the complaint upon the administrator or to file 
proper notice in the appropriate probate court as required under G.L.c. 197, § 9. n2 In opposition, Kirslis 
contends that because the deputy sheriff served the Administrator on March 28, 2001, within twenty days of 
the filing of the complaint, the court has jurisdiction. 
n2 In support of his motion, the defendant also argues that Kirslis's complaint fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted under Mass.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6), and that Kirslis failed to list 
in his complaint the appropriate opposing party under Mass.R.Civ.Pr. 12(b)(8). 
[*5] 
The purpose of G.L.c. 197, § 9 is to "expedite the settlement of estates and thereby protect the substantial 
interests of creditors as well as distributors." See Dept. of Public Welfare v. Anderson, 377 Mass. 23, 28, 
384 NE.2d 628 (1979); see also Downey v. Union Trust Co., 312 Mass. 405, 408, 45 N.E.2d 373 (1942). 
Under G.L.c. 197, § 9, an: 
administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased unless such action is 
commenced within one year after the date of death of the deceased and unless, before the expiration of such 
period, the process in such action has been served by delivery in hand upon such . . . administrator or 
service thereof accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the estate, the name and address of the 
creditor, the amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has been filed in the 
proper registry of probate. 
In the present case, Kirslis is a creditor of the estate who under G.L.c. 197, § 9, raises numerous claims 
against the decedent comprising both issues of contract and tort law. [*6] Although Kirslis timely filed his 
complaint on March 12, 2001, one year to the date of the decedent's death, he did not serve the 
Administrator until March 28, 2001. Such service was not timely under G.L.c. 197, § 9. Kirslis also failed 
to timely file notice of the claim in the Probate Court by March 12, 2001. Under G.L.c. 197, § 9, it is not 
enough that Kirslis filed his complaint with this court within the statutory time period of a year; he must 
also either have served the administrator or have filed a notice of claim in the proper registry of probate 
within the same one-year period. SzeParkerv. Rich, 297 Mass. Ill, 114-15, 8 N E.2d 345 (1937). Because 
he did not do so, the motion to dismiss is, therefore, ALLOWED. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is ALLOWED. 
Raymond J. Brassard 
Justice of the Superior Court 
DATED:July20,2001 
LEXSEE 1995 MASS. SUPER. LEXIS 461 
Seymour Kessler, as Trustee of Jori Kessler Trust, and Arthur S. Davis, 
suing derivatively v. Michael J. Sinclair, Anthony H. Reeves, Carl 
Frischling, Eric J. Gleacher, Theodore Levitt, Raymond S. Troubh, and 
Lifetime Corporation 
92-6764-G 
SUPERIOR COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT SUFFOLK 
4 Mass. L. Rep. 38; 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS 461 
April 21,1995, Decided 
DISPOSITION: [*1] Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is 
ALLOWED. 
LexisNexis (TM) HEADNOTES - Core Concepts: 
OPINION: Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Action for 
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The plaintiffs, Seymour Kessler ("Kessler"), as Trustee of Jori Kessler Trust, and Arthur S. Davis 
("Davis"), brought this derivative action on behalf of Lifetime Corporation ("Lifetime") against the 
defendants, the Lifetime Board of Directors. The defendants have now moved to dismiss the action for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the shares of Lifetime stock owned by Kessler, as Trustee 
of Jori Kessler Trust, were sold on July 21, 1993. Kessler opposes the motion and contends that, since he 
owns shares of Lifetime stock in his capacity as Trustee of Surgical and Orthopedic Podiatrists Ltd. Money 
Purchase Plan ("the SOP Plan"), the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. For the reasons 
which follow, the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is allowed. 
BACKGROUND 
The plaintiffs' derivative action against the defendants challenges Lifetime's payment of allegedly excessive 
compensation to defendant [*2] Michael J. Sinclair ("Sinclair"). At the time the original complaint was 
filed, Kessler, as Trustee of Jori Kessler Trust, owned shares of Lifetime stock. 
The defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to make 
demand upon the Board of Directors of Lifetime and had offered a legally insufficient excuse for this 
failure. On May 4, 1993, the Superior Court dismissed the complaint for failure to make demand. The 
plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of the complaint. 
On July 30, 1993, Lifetime ceased to exist as a corporate entity as a result of a "stock swap" merger into 
Olsten. Pursuant to this merger, Lifetime shareholders relinquished their shares in Lifetime and became 
shareholders in Olsten. The defendants then moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that, by reason of 
the merger and the translation of Kessler's shares into Olsten shares, Kessler lost his standing to prosecute 
the appeal and to maintain the lawsuit. 
On October 27, 1994, the Appeals Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal and vacated 
the judgment of the Superior Court. The Appeals Court remanded the action to the Superior Court [*3] 
with a direction that Kessler amend the complaint "to join Olsten formally as a defendant and to amend the 
complaint on the new footing " nl (Order, p 8 ) 
nl In a footnote, the Appeals Court noted that "Olsten has substituted itself as a defendant m the 
caption of the case on appeal and characterized itself as 'successor by merger to Lifetime 
Corporation ' Formal joinder of Olsten would be desirable (with consequent repleading)" (Order, p 
8,n 11) 
While the Amended Complaint was being prepared, Kessler became aware that, on or about July 21, 1993, 
his broker had caused the Lifetime shares owned by the Jon Kessler Trust to be sold Kessler, however, still 
owned 311 shares of Olsten stock in his capacity as Trustee of the SOP Plan Kessler thereby changed the 
caption of the Amended Complaint and listed himself, as Trustee of the SOP Plan, as the plaintiff in this 
action The defendants contend that, when all the shares of Lifetime stock owned by Kessler, as Trustee of 
the Jon Kessler Trust, were sold [*4] on July 21, 1993, Kessler lost standing to maintain this action and, 
therefore, this action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
DISCUSSION 
"Whenever it appears by suggestion of a party or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action " Mass R Civ P 12(h)(3), Flynn v Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Board 17 Mass App Ct 668 670 n 3 461 N E 2d 1225 (1984) Because subject 
matter jurisdiction is an issue to be determined solely by the court, the parties cannot waive jurisdiction or 
confer jurisdiction where it does not exist Shea v Nepomet River Marine & Sportfishing Inc 14 Mass 
App Ct 121 129, 437NE2d250 (1982) Markv Kahn 333 Mass 517 519 131 NE2d758 (1956) 
Both parties concede that, under Delaware law, a plaintiff must retain his status as a shareholder throughout 
the litigation m order to continue to prosecute a derivative action Portnoy v Kawecki Berylco Industries 
Inc, 607 F 2d 765 767 (7th Cir 1979) "A plaintiff who ceases to be a shareholder, whether by reason of a 
merger, or for any other reason, loses standing to continue a derivative suit" [*5] Lewis v Anderson 477 
A 2d 1040 1049(1984) 
The central issue presented is whether Kessler, by changing the caption on the Amended Complaint and 
alleging that he is now proceeding as Trustee of the SOP Plan, rather than as Trustee of Jon Kessler Trust, 
can maintain this action Mass R Civ P 8(a) requires a complaint to set forth a "claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief " Mass R Civ P 8(a) Pursuant to Delaware law, Kessler, as Trustee of Jon 
Kessler Trust, lost his standing to pursue a derivative action against the defendants when the Lifetime stock, 
owned by Jon Kessler Trust, was sold on July 21, 1994 
Mass R Civ P 17(a) requires that every action be prosecuted m the name of the real party in interest and 
allows a trustee of an express trust to sue as the trust, without joining the beneficiaries of the trust 
Mass R Civ P 17(a) However, as the defendants contend, neither Mass R Civ P 17(a) nor any other 
procedural device allows a trustee of one trust to prosecute an action for a wholly different trust, unless the 
other trust, through its representative, commences a new action or moves to intervene in the pending action 
See Mass R Civ P [*6] 24(b) and (c) 
Kessler contends that the Appeals Court, in its October 27 1994 decision, explicitly directed Kessler to 
amend the complaint Kessler therefore asserts that it was proper for him to file the Amended Complaint m 
the capacity of Trustee of the SOP Plan The court disagrees The Appeals Court addressed the effect of the 
merger of Lifetime with Olsten, and ordered the plaintiff to join Olsten formally as a defendant However, 
the decision of the Appeals Court did not contemplate the substitution of a completely different plaintiff, if 
Kessler, in his named capacity, were to sell his stock and thereby lose standing 
Contrary to Kessler's contention, Kessler, as Trustee of the SOP Plan, cannot inject himself into a pending 
action simply by placing his name on the caption of the Amended Complaint Accordingly, because Kessler, 
as Trustee of Jon Kessler Trust, has no standing to maintain this action, the defendants' motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is allowed While Kessler, as Trustee of the SOP Plan, may well have 
a valid action against the defendants, he must properly exercise those rights by commencing a new action in 
this capacity. [*7] 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is 
ALLOWED. 
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OPINIONBY: James P. Donohue 
OPINION: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, Rehabilitative Resources, Inc., brought this action, pursuant to G.L.c. 40A, §17, challenging 
the defendants,1 members of the Planning Board of the Town of Sturbridge, decision to deny approval of a 
site plan in connection with the issuance of a building permit. This matter is before the court on both 
parties' motions for summary judgment. Because of the dispositive issue raised by the defendants, the court 
will treat defendants' motion as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). For the reasons set 
forth below, defendants' motion is allowed. 
BACKGROUND 
This matter involves an appeal of a July 9, 2002 decision by the defendants, disapproving a site plan 
submitted by plaintiff. The site plan, which depicted the proposed construction of an office building and 
related improvements on a lot already containing an office building, was denied approval, because it 
allegedly lacked the necessary frontage, lot width and setback, and because the proposed use would 
exacerbate [*2] existing traffic congestion on the abutting public way. As set forth below, the complaint 
must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
DISCUSSION 
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to whether a court can hear a particular type of suit. Lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction is the only 12(b) motion that can be made at any stage of the proceedings. Mass.R.Civ.P. 
12(g), (h). A court should decide the issue of whether it has jurisdiction over the subject on its own motion 
if the parties have not raised the issue. See Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 519, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956). 
Subject matter jurisdiction is an issue to be determined solely by the court, therefore the parties cannot 
waive jurisdiction or confer jurisdiction where it does not exist See id. 
The statutorily required submission of zoning disputes to local authorities is so central to the 
architecture of G.L.c. 40A, that courts of the Commonwealth have required the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies as a prerequisite to judicial review. See Quincy v. Planning Board of Tewksbury, 39 
Mass.App.Ct. 17, 20, 652 N.E.2d901 (1995) (citations omitted). "Within the zoning context, [*3| 
therefore, principles of exhaustion require that a person aggrieved by the action of a local zoning 
administrator. . . must first attempt to redress the grievance through the local board of appeals before 
seeking judicial review." Id. 
Where the municipal body charged with the site plan review is designated a special permit granting 
authority for that purpose, a site plan review decision is directly appealable to the Superior Court pursuant 
to G.L.c. 40A, §17. See id. at 21-22. When, however, the site plan review does not result in the issuance of 
a special permit, but is required in connection with the issuance of a building permit, the review "is not a 
final action, but only a prerequisite to the grant of the [building] permit." St. Botolph Citizens Comm., Inc. 
v. Boston Redev. Authy., 429 Mass. 1, 9, 705 N.E.2d 617 (1999). The appeals court has already established 
that the site plan review procedure in Sturbridge is not a special permit process, but is a review process in 
connection with the issuance of a building permit. See Osberg v. Planning Board of Sturbridge, 44 
Mass.App.Ct. 56, 57-59, 687N.E.2d 1274 (1997). [*4] 
If site plan review is required as a condition of the issuance of a building permit, "the right of an 
aggrieved person to appeal a local planning board's site plan review decision arises only when the building 
permit for the proposed project is issued or denied by the building inspector." St. Botolph Citizens Comm., 
Inc., 429 Mass. at 9, citing Quincy, 39 Mass.App.Ct. at 20-22. See Dufault v. Millennium Power Partners, 
49 Mass.App.Ct. 137, 140-42, 727 N.E.2d87 (2000). A person aggrieved by reason of his inability to 
obtain a building permit may appeal to the permit granting authority as the bylaw may provide. G.L.c. 40A, 
§ 8. In Sturbridge, that authority is the Zoning Board of Appeals. 
Plaintiff argues that it would be an exercise in absurdity and futility to request a building permit which 
would automatically be denied because of the lack of site plan approval; then it would have to go through 
another hurdle, the board of appeals. While the court is sympathetic to plaintiffs frustrations, the case law is 
clear that in order to proceed to the courts, all administrative remedies must be exhausted, without [*5] 
regard to whether the appeal is from an approval of the site plan or the denial of the same. See St. Botolph 
Citizens Comm., Inc., 429 Mass. at 9; Quincy, 39 Mass.App.Ct. at 20-22. Because the plaintiff has not 
exhausted its administrative remedies, it is premature for this court to entertain this action. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiffs complaint be DISMISSED for this 
court lacks jurisdiction. 
James P. Donohue 
Justice of Superior Court 
DATED: December 13, 2002 
TabC 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS A. LOVELL, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS A. LOVELL 
Case No. 921900407 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
I, Douglas A. Lovell, being first duly sworn according to law, on my oath depose and say: 
1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled case. 
2. I was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison in August of 1993 and had been 
incarcerated continuously for several years prior to the filing of this case. 
3. On August 5, 1993, Second District Court Judge Stanton Taylor rendered a 
memorandum decision in this case and announced that he had decided I would receive a sentence 
of death by lethal injection. 
4. On August 25, 1993,1 wrote a letter to Judge Taylor moving for the withdrawal of 
my guilty plea to aggravated murder. 
5. On August 25, 1993,1 mailed this letter to Judge Taylor in an envelope properly 
addressed to him by giving it to prison authorities in the Uintah II facility of the Utah State Prison, 
Draper, Utah. 
6. This letter should have been mailed by prison authorities in the Uintah II facility on 
August 25, 1993 or at the latest on the next day, August 26, 1993 according to their policy. Once 
inmate mail is turned over to prison personnel for mailing, the inmate has no control over its delivery 
and no means of ensuring it is placed into the United States mail in a timely fashion. 
DATED this 2 2 r day of July 2002. 
DOUGLAS A. LOVELL 
Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 2 Z . day of July 2002. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in S<^ /j~ Cg K<? 
My Commission Expires: 
2 1911 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(IN CHAMBERS) 
THE COURT: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT I ' M IN CHAMBERS 
WITH COUNSEL IN THE MATTER OF STATE OF UTAH VERSUS DOUGLAS 
LOVELL. 
THERE I S A PRELIMINARY REQUEST MADE OF THE STATE, AND 
WE'RE GOING TO GO AHEAD AND PUT THEIR STATEMENT ON THE RECORD 
AND ANY RESPONSE FROM DEFENSE COUNSEL. 
GO AHEAD, MR. DAINES. 
MR. DAINES: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
TO RE — TO REITERATE WHAT I HAVE PREVIOUSLY SAID OFF 
THE RECORD, WHEN WE WROTE OUR BRIEF IT BECAME APPARENT TO US 
THAT THERE — IN — IN OUR OPINION THERE WAS NO QUESTION, BUT 
THERE WAS CERTAINLY A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE COURT EVEN 
HAD JURISDICTION TO BE HEARING THEIR MOTION, EVEN HAD THE 
POWER TO — TO DO THAT. 
AND SO OUR BRIEF — AS YOUR HONOR MAY HAVE NOTICED — I S 
COUCHED IN TERMS OF A MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON THE FAILURE 
OF JURISDICTION. AND AT THE END OF OUR BRIEF, WE 
SPECIFICALLY PUT IN THERE THAT WE WOULD INTEND TO THEN, I F 
YOUR HONOR FINDS JURISDICTION, WRITE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE 
ISSUES RAISED BY THEIR INITIAL BRIEF . WE PUT THAT IN OUR 
FIRST B R I E F . 
I — ON — IN JANUARY OF 2 0 0 2 , I WROTE FRAN A LETTER — 
AND MAY I SHOW THIS TO HIM? 
Tanr--ia Qhinrrlo C P R 
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1 MR. WIKSTROM: OF COURSE. 
2 MR. DAINES: OKAY. IN WHICH I STATED THE SAME 
3 THING, THAT WE INTENDED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION. 
4 AND THEN ONLY IF YOUR HONOR WERE TO FIND THE EXISTENCE OF 
5 JURISDICTION WOULD WE THEN ARGUE THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT 
6 ARE RAISED IN THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF. AND I RECEIVED NO REPLY 
7 FROM THAT. 
8 NOW MR. WIKSTROM, THIS MORNING, POINTED OUT THAT THERE 
9 IS A FOOTNOTE 1 WHERE THEY OBJECT TO OUR PROCEEDING THIS WAY, 
10 BUT THAT'S — AND I HADN'T NOTICED THAT. AND THE REASON I 
11 HADN'T IS BECAUSE WE HAD DIVIDED THIS UP, ASSUMING THAT THIS 
12 WAS OUR MOTION. 
13 IT'S OUR POSITION THAT WE PROCEED FIRST AND LAST ON THIS 
14 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. I DON'T THINK 
15 YOUR HONOR CAN MAKE ANY OTHER DECISIONS IN THIS CASE UNTIL 
16 SUCH TIME AS YOU HAVE FOUND — AND THERE'S A REAL ISSUE OF 
17 JURISDICTION HERE — AND UNTIL YOU HAVE FOUND YOU HAVE 
18 JURISDICTION TO EVEN HEAR THIS, WE DIDN'T INTEND TO RAISE THE 
19 OTHER ISSUES. 
20 AND SO IT WOULD BE OUR POSITION THAT WE ARGUE FIRST AND 
21 THAT WE ARGUE LAST ON THIS, AND THAT'S THE WAY WE'VE PREPARED 
22 FOR TODAY. AND, FRANKLY, I WAS A LITTLE SURPRISED TO LEARN 
23 THIS MORNING THAT THAT WASN'T WHAT WE WERE — WHAT THE 
24 DEFENSE'S VIEW OF WHAT WE WERE DOING HERE IS BECAUSE THEIR 
25 RESPONSE BRIEF BASICALLY GOES TO THE ISSUES RAISED BY OUR 
J 
Laurie Shincrl^ . r.s P 
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MOTION TO DISMISS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. DAINES: AND SO IT WOULD BE OUR POSITION THAT 
THAT IS THE WAY THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED TODAY. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
MR. WIKSTROM: YOUR HONOR, IF IT PLEASE THE COURT, 
IT — THERE'S NO QUESTION THAT MR. DAINES HAS MADE HIS 
POSITION CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THAT'S WHAT HE'S GOING 
TO DO, BUT WE ALSO MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR WHEN WE SAID, IN 
OUR RESPONSE, THAT THE STATE CITES NO AUTHORITY ALLOWING IT 
TO MOVE TO DISMISS A MOTION RATHER THAN OPPOSE IT. THE STATE 
SHOULD HAVE ADDRESSED THE MERITS OF THE MOTION AND INCLUDED 
ITS OTHER ARGUMENTS IN THE OPPOSITION. 
AND SO IT'S BEEN NO SECRET THAT THAT'S OUR POSITION, 
THAT WE'RE HERE ON OUR MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA. THEY 
CERTAINLY ARE ENTITLED TO ARGUE THEIR JURISDICTIONAL 
ARGUMENTS, BE WE WERE PREPARED TO ARGUE OUR — OUR MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW THE PLEA. AND SINCE THAT REALLY IS — YOU'RE GOING 
TO DETERMINE THAT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD, THERE'S NO 
EVIDENCE OR ANYTHING ELSE REQUIRED. IT'S A FAIRLY SIMPLE 
ISSUE OF LOOKING AT THE PLEA COLLOQUY AND DECIDING WHETHER 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11 WERE MET. 
AND SO I — I GUESS IT'S ONE OF THOSE THINGS WHERE WE 
CAME WITH A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING AND OUR — OUR 
POSITION WAS TO ARGUE THE ENTIRE MOTION, INCLUDING RESPONDING 
TauriP ^hinalp. P.S.R. 
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TO THEIR JURISDICTIONAL OBJECTIONS. 
AND WHAT WAS SAID — THERE'S NO GREAT ISSUE ABOUT WHAT 
WAS SAID AT THE PLEA COLLOQUY. IT'S REALLY A QUESTION OF LAW 
FOR YOU TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT MEETS RULE 11. 
SO IT WOULD BE OUR POSITION THAT THE DEFENDANT IS 
ENTITLED TO GO FORWARD ON ITS MOTION. AND THEY CAN RAISE ANY 
ARGUMENT — ANY OPPOSITION THEY WANT, INCLUDING JURISDICTION, 
IN RESPONSE, BUT IT IS OUR MOTION. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. GO AHEAD. ' 
MR. DAINES: AND IN RESPONSE TO THAT, WE CAN ALWAYS 
RAISE A MOTION AS TO JURISDICTION, AS TO WHETHER THE COURT 
HAS POWER TO EVEN HEAR A CASE. 
WE'RE SIMPLY SAYING IN OUR RESPONSE THAT THERE IS NO 
POWER HERE. THIS CASE HAS NEVER BEEN BEFORE THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DETERMINATION OF THE MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW A PLEA. IT WAS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN THE 
BEGINNING. AND WE HAVE A RIGHT TO FILE THAT MOTION AND 
THAT'S THE WAY WE COUCHED
 THIS. THAT'S WHAT WE DID HERE, AND 
AS YOUR HONOR HAS NOTICED, THAT'S WHAT OUR BRIEF ADDRESSES. 
AND NOTHING HAS COME UP ON THIS ISSUE UNTIL THE ONE LITTLE 
FOOTNOTE IN THEIR BRIEF. THEY DIDN'T EVEN BRIEF THAT. 
THE COURT: LET ME JUST TELL YOU, I -- IRRESPECTIVE 
OF WHAT YOUR INDIVIDUAL EXPECTATIONS WERE, AS I READ THE 
BRIEFS AND — AND I STUDIED THEM, AND I READ YOUR FOOTNOTE, I 
AM PREPARED TODAY ON WHAT WAS RAISED IN THE BRIEFS RELATIVE 
Laurie Shinalo r Q p 
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TO THE JURISDICTION QUESTION. I — I STUDIED BOTH SIDES. I 
HAVE — IN A VERY CURSORY WAY YESTERDAY I READ THE ORIGINAL 
MOTION THAT WAS FILED, JUST TO GET A FEEL FOR WHAT, YOU KNOW, 
MIGHT BE AT ISSUE THERE. BUT IT IS MY INTENTION TODAY TO 
ONLY ADDRESS THE — WHAT WAS BRIEFED BY BOTH SIDES IN THE 
MEMORANDA THAT WERE FILED WITH THIS COURT. 
SO I — I DON'T SEE ANY POINT IN HAVING YOU TAKE TIME 
TODAY TO ADDRESS THE MERITS OF THE ORIGINAL MOTION. IF WE 
GET THERE, THEN I THINK THE STATE -- I'M GOING TO GIVE THE 
STATE A CHANCE TO ADDRESS THOSE ISSUES BECAUSE YOU DIDN'T 
ADDRESS THEM. I MEAN, YES, IT'S IN YOUR ORIGINAL MOTION AND 
I — I AGREE THAT THERE'S A MEMORANDUM ON FILE, BUT IT — IT 
MADE SENSE TO ME FOR THE COURT TO TAKE THIS A STEP AT A TIME 
AND TO ADDRESS THE JURISDICTION QUESTION TODAY AND THEN GIVE 
THE STATE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE ORIGINAL MOTION, 
WHICH IT HAS NOT DONE. AND IT WOULD BE GROSSLY UNFAIR FOR 
THE COURT TO EVEN PRESUME TO RULE WITHOUT GIVING THE STATE A 
CHANCE TO — TO RESPOND. AND IT HAS NOT AND I DON'T INTEND 
TO RULE TODAY. 
MR. WIKSTROM: VERY WELL, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. DONALDSON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THANK YOU. 
MR. DAINES: THANK YOU. 
(PROCEEDINGS RESUME IN OPEN COURT.) 
THE COURT: GOOD MORNING. 
